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Abstract. Clustering has been well studied for desktop malware anal-
ysis as an effective triage method. Conventional similarity-based clus-
tering techniques, however, cannot be immediately applied to Android
malware analysis due to the excessive use of third-party libraries in An-
droid application development and the widespread use of repackaging
in malware development. We design and implement an Android mal-
ware clustering system through iterative mining of malicious payload
and checking whether malware samples share the same version of mali-
cious payload. Our system utilizes a hierarchical clustering technique and
an efficient bit-vector format to represent Android apps. Experimental
results demonstrate that our clustering approach achieves precision of
0.90 and recall of 0.75 for Android Genome malware dataset, and aver-
age precision of 0.98 and recall of 0.96 with respect to manually verified
ground-truth.
1 Introduction
Triaging is an important step in malware analysis given the large number of
samples received daily by security companies. Clustering, or grouping malware
based on behavioral profiles is a widely-studied technique that allows analysts to
focus their efforts on new types of malware. Multiple static [14,30], dynamic [2,
22], and hybrid [12] analysis based clustering techniques have been proposed in
the desktop malware domain.
With the rapid growth of Android smart devices, malicious Android apps
have become a persistent problem. Security companies receive a list of (poten-
tial zero-day) malware on a daily basis [28]. Those apps that present certain
suspicious behaviors but are not detected by any existing anti-virus scanners
need to be further analyzed manually. Conducting clustering on those incoming
malware apps can allow the analysts to triage their tasks by (a) quickly identify-
ing malware that shares similar behaviors with known existing malware so they
may not allocate much resources on it; and (b) selecting a few representative
apps from each new malware cluster to prioritize their analysis.
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We often observe that existing approaches to group Android malware based
on their behaviors have provided limited capabilities. For example, existing An-
droid malware detection products may report a family name for a detected sam-
ple; however, samples from one family can have multiple different versions of
malicious code segments presenting significantly different behaviors. Therefore,
the malware family information provided by AV products can be incomplete to
describe crucial malicious code segments of Android malware.
Existing overall similarity analysis based clustering system cannot be im-
mediately applied for Android malware clustering because the malicious code
segments often constitute only a small fraction of an Android malware sample.
In desktop malware clustering, the static or dynamic features are first extracted
from target samples. Then a clustering algorithm (e.g., hierarchical agglomer-
ative clustering) is applied to group the samples such that samples within the
same resulting group share high level of overall similarity. However, we note
that overall similarity analysis performs poorly in Android malware clustering
because of two common practices in Android malware development.
The first practice is repackaging. Malware writers may embed the malicious
code inside an otherwise legitimate app, in which case the real malicious code
segment is likely to be small compared to the original benign app. Our analysis
shows that the ratio of the core malicious code segments to the entire app for a
collection of 19,725 malware samples is between 0.1% and 58.2%. Given the small
percentage of malicious code segments, the conventional clustering approach that
is based on overall code similarity will not work well. For example, two malicious
samples from different families can be repackaged based on the same original
benign app, thus presenting high level of overall similarity. Likewise, Android
malware variants with the same malicious code of one family can be repackaged
into different original benign apps, thus presenting low level of overall similarity.
Another practice is utilizing shared library code. Android apps often include
a variety of third-party libraries to implement extra functionalities in a cost-
effective way. If the library code size is too large compared to the rest of the
app, samples from different malware families may be clustered together simply
because they share the same libraries. We measured the library code proportion
of the 19,725 malware samples. For 13,233 of the samples that used at least
one legitimate library, we found that the average library code ratio is 53.1% in
terms of number of byte code instructions. This means a large portion of an
Android app belongs to libraries. One approach to prevent those libraries from
“diluting” the malicious code segments is to use a whitelist [4–6,8,10] to exclude
all library code. However, previous work leverages only the names of libraries
while building a whitelist as opposed to the content of libraries. We observed that
malware authors injected their malicious code under popular library names, such
as com.google.ssearch, com.android.appupdate, android.ad.appoffer, and
com.umeng.adutils. Consequently, na¨ıve whitelisting approaches inadvertently
remove certain malicious payloads together with the legitimate library code from
analysis. We found that about 30% of our analyzed Android malware families
disguise their malicious payload under popular library names.
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Due to the above two reasons, directly applying overall similarity analysis on
Android apps will not be effective for Android malware analysis. A major chal-
lenge is to precisely identify the malicious code segments of Android malware.
For simplicity, we refer to the core malicious code segments of Android malware
as malicious payload. A payload can be an added/modified part of a repack-
aged malware app, or the entire code of “standalone” malware app excluding
legitimate library code.
In this paper we propose an Android malware clustering approach through
iterative mining of malicious payloads. Our main contributions include:
1. We design and implement an Android malware clustering solution through
checking if apps share the same version of the malicious payloads. By re-
constructing the original malicious payloads, our approach offers an effective
Android malware app clustering solution along with fundamental insights
into malware grouping.
2. We design a novel method to precisely remove legitimate library code from
Android apps, and still preserve the malicious payloads even if they are
injected under popular library names.
3. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the consistency and robust-
ness of our clustering solution. Our experimental results demonstrate that
our clustering approach achieves precision of 0.90 and recall of 0.75 for An-
droid Genome malware dataset, and average precision of 0.984 and recall of
0.959 regarding manually verified ground-truth.
2 Overview of Android Malware Clustering System
Rather than directly conducting overall similarity analysis between Android mal-
ware samples, we first design a solution to precisely remove legitimate library
code from Android apps. We consider the shared code segments (excluding legit-
imate library code) between the analyzed Android apps as candidate payload,
and find all of the input Android apps through pairwise intersection analysis. For
a group of n apps, each input app will contribute to n− 1 versions of candidate
payloads.
After extracting all candidate payloads, we conduct traditional clustering
analysis on all candidate payloads to group similar ones together. Base on sev-
eral key insights that are learned from analyzing candidate payload clustering
results, we design an effective approach to iteratively mine the payload clusters
that are most likely to be malicious, and make sure that each input app will
only contribute one version of malicious payload. Finally, we use the identified
malicious payload clusters and payload-to-app association information to group
the input Android malware apps. We describe this process in more details below.
Figure 1 illustrates the overview of the clustering analysis system with five
malware samples.
1. Library code removal: We convert malware samples into fingerprint rep-
resentation, and design an effective approach to precisely remove legitimate
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Fig. 1. Overview of the clustering system with five Android malware samples.
library code from each app fingerprint. We denote the library-removed app
fingerprints as fp1, fp2, fp3, fp4, and fp5 accordingly.
2. Candidate payloads extraction: We conduct a pairwise intersection anal-
ysis to extract all shared code segments (e.g., candidate payloads) between
input apps. Relying on the app fingerprint representation, we create candi-
date payload fingerprints, and record the payload-to-app association infor-
mation. For example, fp1-2 indicates that this candidate payload is extracted
from malware sample 1 and 2.
3. Candidate payloads clustering: We then perform hierarchical clustering
on all candidate payloads with a predefined clustering similarity threshold θ,
e.g., the candidate payload fingerprints fp1-2, fp1-3, and fp2-3 are grouped
together as the largest payload cluster based on the overall payload similarity.
4. Malicious payload mining: After removing legitimate libraries, similar
malicious payloads extracted from samples in the same malware family will
become more popular4 due to the “legitimate” reason of code reuse. There-
fore, we design an iterative approach to mine the popular payload clusters
from the clustering results, which are more likely malicious payload. For in-
stance, candidate payload cluster containing fp1-2, fp1-3, and fp2-3 is selected
as the most popular cluster. To ensure that each input app only contributes
one version of final malicious payload, we simultaneously update the remain-
ing payload clusters. e.g., fingerprints fp1-4, fp1-5, fp2-4, fp2-5, fp3-4, and
fp3-5 are then skipped because malware sample 1, 2 and 3 have already been
“used”.
5. Malicious samples grouping: We group the original Android samples
based on payload mining results and payload-to-app association information
such that the samples within each app cluster contains the same version of
the malicious payload. For example, malware samples 1, 2, and 3 are grouped
together based on the selected candidate payload cluster containing fp1-2,
fp1-3, and fp2-3.
4 Further intuition explanation and popularity criteria are included in Section 4.
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3 App Fingerprint Representation and Utilization
As we can see from Section 2, the clustering system requires an effective fin-
gerprint representation to denote input Android apps and candidate payloads.
Ideally, the fingerprint needs to be constructed from the code segments of the in-
put app and support two fundamental operations: precisely removing legitimate
code, correctly extracting shared app code.
Based on these requirements, we decide to represent Android apps as bit-
vector fingerprints, by encoding the features that are extracted from app code
through feature hashing [13, 14, 26]. The value of each bit in the generated fin-
gerprint is either 0 or 1, indicating whether the corresponding app has a specific
feature or not.
This bit-vector format enables us to precisely remove legitimate library code
(Section 3.2), extract shared code segments (Section 3.3), and reconstruct the
original malicious payload (Section 3.4) by utilizing the bit manipulation capa-
bility.
3.1 Fingerprint Generation and Fingerprint Comparison
In this work, we use n-gram sequence of Dalvik bytecode to denote an Android
app feature, and use a bit-vector fingerprint to represent the extracted features.
The overall fingerprint generation process is shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Overall fingerprint generation procedure
For each Android app, we first use Dexdump [7] to disassemble classes.dex
into Dalvik bytecode, then preprocess the Dalvik bytecode sequences to only
include the major distinctive information and extract the n-gram features from
the preprecessed bytecode sequences. We follow similar approach to extract the
distinctive information (e.g., bytecode opcode) for feature construction as Jux-
tapp [11]. Since feature space is vital to support the key operations designed in
this work, we decide to increase the feature space by including more generic but
meaningful information from each bytecode instruction. The major distinctive
information is separated into 4 categories and summarized in Table 1. Besides
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the feature differences shown in Table 1, we extract the n-gram features at the
function level, while Juxtapp extracts n-gram features at the basic block level.
For simplicity, we only show the Dalvik bytecode opcode sequences as the dis-
tinctive instruction information in Figure 2.
Table 1. Major feature categories and main differences comparing with Juxtapp
Feature Category Examples Our Approach Juxtapp
Dalvik bytecode opcode sequences sget, goto, return X X
Java VM type signatures Z(Boolean), B(byte) X
String value of const-string instructions - X
Type signatures for “invoked” functions f(I,[B)Z X
After extracting all the n-gram features, we then encode all the features in
a bit-vector format fingerprint through feature hashing technique using djb2
hash function. During feature hashing process, we use a tuple A(i, j) to represent
a feature position, in which i is the function offset indicating from which function
the particular n-gram feature is extracted, and j is the bytecode offset indicating
the position of the n-gram feature within the corresponding function. Then the
feature-to-bit information is stored in a map, in which the key is the bit index
within the fingerprint indicating where the feature is stored, and the value is
the list of feature tuples that are mapped to the bit location. With increased
feature space, we hope to reduce majority ofthe random feature collisions, and
allow each bit index to represent the same n-gram feature content.
Similar to the complete Android apps, individual legitimate libraries and the
candidate malicious payloads are also represented in the same size of bit-vector
fingerprints. The concrete n-gram size and the fingerprint size used for clustering
are determined through analyzing the collision rate of random features, which is
discussed in Section 6.2.
To measure the similarity between two fingerprints, we use the Jaccard index,
or the Jaccard similarity, which is defined as the size of intersection divided by
the size of union of two sets. Since each fingerprint is a bit-vector, we leverage
cache-efficient bit-wise AND (∧) and bit-wise OR (∨) operations to compute the
intersection and the union. Then, the similarity of two fingerprints fpa and fpb
is defined as follows:
Similarity(fpa, fpb) =
S(fpa ∧ fpb)
S(fpa ∨ fpb) , (1)
where S(·) denotes the number of 1-bits in the input.
Our fixed-sized bit-vector fingerprint representation also allows us to easily
measure containment ratio in a similar fashion:
Containment(fpa, fpb) =
S(fpa ∧ fpb)
S(fpa)
, (2)
which measures how much of the content of fpa is contained in fpb.
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3.2 Fingerprint based Library Code Removal
To precisely remove legitimate library code without excluding a possibly injected
malicious payload, we exclude legitimate library code from an app by removing
the library-mapped bits from the app bit-vector fingerprint. For each legitimate
library, we collect its official jar file and disassemble it into Dalvik bytecode
sequences; then apply the same feature hashing technique to map the n-gram
features of the library code into a bit-vector fingerprint fplib. We then flip all
the bits in the library fingerprint to get fplib. Since the same features contained
in an Android app and the library are mapped to the same bit positions in
their fingerprint representation, we can exclude library-mapped bits from an
app fingerprint by bit-wise ANDing fplib and fpapp. Figure 3 demonstrates the
overall procedure to safely remove legitimate twitter4j library code from a
malware sample.
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Fig. 3. Example procedure to safely remove
legitimate “twitter4j” library code
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Fig. 4. Extracting a candidate payload
from two malware applications
We first conduct statistical analysis for the disassembled apps to identify the
embedded legitimate libraries, and record the years when the target samples
were created. We then obtain5 the officially released library jar files to create
the corresponding library fingerprints, and remove the library code from the
analyzed apps. The library code removal process is applied only when an app
contains code snippets that are defined under corresponding library namespaces.
In our implementation, each library is represented with an individual fin-
gerprint. We encode multiple versions of the same library together in a single
library fingerprint. This aggregated library representation may cause potential
feature collision between the app code and the irrelevant versions of the library
code. However, we empirically demonstrate in Section 6.3 that the library code
removal process is precise because different versions of the same library typically
share high level of code similarity due to code reuse, and the size of the single
library is often smaller than the entire app.
5 We randomly select one version of library in each year in case there are multiple
versions of libraries released within the same year.
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3.3 Fingerprint based Candidate Payload Extraction
The next operation is to extract malicious payloads from malware samples. We
consider the shared code segments (after excluding legitimate libraries) between
each malware sample pair to be a candidate malicious payload. For a group of
malware samples, we obtain the intersection of every fingerprint pair of library-
excluded samples, and consider the shared 1-bits between the sample fingerprints
as a candidate payload fingerprint.
Figure 4 describes the intersection analysis procedure to extract a candidate
malicious payload at a high level. For two malware samples we first build their
fingerprints and exclude the legitimate library bits from the fingerprints. Then we
pinpoint their shared 1-bits (e.g., bits index 2, 3, and 4) as potentially malicious6
bits and construct a candidate payload fingerprint.
During the candidate payload extraction process, we keep track of the as-
sociation information between the candidate payload (e.g., A1-2) and the cor-
responding samples (e.g., A1 and A2). We subsequently use the payload-to-app
association information and the malicious payload mining results to group mal-
ware samples.
3.4 Fingerprint based Malicious Payload Reconstruction
Using the bit-vector fingerprint representation, we can also define the cluster
fingerprint for a version of the candidate payload cluster as the intersection of
all the candidate payload fingerprints in the cluster. The 1-bits contained in the
resulting cluster fingerprint can be viewed as the shared malicious bits for all
input apps that share the same version of malicious payload.
Using the identified malicious bits from app fingerprints, we can then recon-
struct the corresponding malicious payload code by checking the feature-to-bit
mapping information that was recorded during feature hashing, which can be
viewed as the reverse procedure of fingerprint generation. Given the identified
malicious bits, we locate the feature tuples that are mapped to those identified
malicious bits. We use each retrieved feature tuple to locate the n lines of code
where the n-gram feature is extracted, then reconstruct complete malicious code
sequences by properly stitching the identified n lines of code segments together.
In practice, feature collision is possible but becomes negligible with appro-
priate n-gram size and fingerprint size, thus we will rarely recover the irrelevant
code. To certain extent, payload code reconstruction compensates feature hash-
ing collisions (e.g., resulting in missing n-grams) as far as the missing n-gram is
within the overlapped original code sequences of recovered features. The recon-
structed malicious payload code can be further inspected to verify its malicious-
ness.
6 malicious payload mapped
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4 Malicious Payload Mining
Key insights: (a) In practice, when feature hashing is configured to have a
low collision rate, malware app fingerprints will not contain a large number of
shared 1-bits unless they do share certain common features (e.g., payload code
snippets). (b) Likewise, if a target dataset contains malware samples that do
share the same version of the malicious payload, then the candidate payload
fingerprints extracted from those samples will contain similar shared 1-bits and
be automatically clustered into the same group. (c) After removing legitimate
library code from an app, similar malicious payloads have higher chances to form
a larger cluster than the ones related to less popular libraries or coincidentally
shared code segments. (d) Compared to coincidentally shared code segments,
similar malicious payloads will have a larger shared code base because of “legiti-
mate” reason of code reuse in the same malware family, and the fingerprints for
the malicious payloads will have a larger amount of shared 1-bits.
Based on the above key insights, we design the following strategies to itera-
tively select representative candidate payload clusters based on payload popular-
ity, which is determined based on the three criteria: the entry size of a payload
cluster l, the number of distinct apps associated with a payload cluster m, and
1-bits count of a payload cluster fingerprint k.
– We count the number of candidate payload fingerprint entries in each clus-
ter, and maximize the possibility of extracting core malicious payloads by
selecting the clusters with the largest number of payload fingerprint entries.
Payload cluster size l is a direct indicator for the popularity of the shared
code segments between malware samples, and such popular shared code is a
good candidate for one version of malicious payloads since we have already
filtered out popular legitimate library code.
– We measure the distinct apps m that contribute to generating candidate
payload fingerprints of each cluster, and select the clusters with the largest
number of distinct apps if they have the same number of payload entries.
Payload clusters that contain a large number of unique payload entries are
often associated with a large number of distinct apps, and we use this app
association information to break the tie in case the number of cluster en-
tries are the same since distinct apps can be considered as another sign of
comparative popularity.
– We obtain the intersection bits k of payload fingerprint entries in each clus-
ter as the cluster fingerprint. If two clusters are associated with the same
number of distinct apps, we then select the one with the larger number of
1-bits in its cluster fingerprint. In this way, we can extract the payload with
a larger code size, and it helps to increase the likelihood of getting mali-
cious payloads together with shared libraries, and we subsequently exclude
possibly remaining libraries later.
– During cluster selection, we keep track of which apps have been used to
generate candidate payload fingerprints in the previously selected clusters,
and consider already-selected apps as “inactive”. We update the remaining
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payload clusters by removing candidate fingerprint entries that are associ-
ated with “inactive” apps. Skipping such fingerprints allows us to extract
one version of the malicious payload from each app. This helps to merge all
the shared core malicious code together, and only extract the widely shared
malicious code between all apps, which also helps to reduce the probability
of extracting non-malicious payload code.
– We omit a payload cluster if the corresponding cluster fingerprint contains
less than the minimum k number of 1-bits, meaning that the extracted code
segments are too small. It forces the algorithm to break the current large
payload cluster into smaller clusters with a larger code size, and prevent dif-
ferent malware families from being clustered together. We set the minimum
number of 1-bits k to 70 since the majority of the analyzed Android malware
app fingerprints had more than 70 1-bits.
– We exclude a candidate payload cluster if it becomes empty after the update
in the last step, or if the number of payload fingerprint entries is too small
(e.g., l = 1). This is because Clusters with only a single candidate payload
entry provide little additional popularity information, and are more likely
to contain less popular libraries or other coincidentally shared code snip-
pets. We consider malware samples associated with such payload clusters as
unclustered, and the unclustered app is evaluated as a singleton.
The shared payloads between Android samples can be library code seg-
ments, malicious payloads, copy-and-pasted code segments, or other coinciden-
tally shared code segments. The above payload mining strategy enables us to
select the most likely malicious candidate payload groups. Legitimate non-library
reused code may be collected together with malicious payload only if it is shared
across a significant number of apps. Otherwise, the less popular legitimate non-
library code will be evidently excluded during the (popularity-based) payload
mining procedure. If the same benign app is indeed used by many malware apps,
we can further exclude original benign app code (i.e., the legitimate non-library
reused code) in a similar way to remove library code using a benign app finger-
print.
5 Optimize Overall Clustering Efficiency
According to the previously discussed malicious payload mining procedure, we
will generate n×(n−1)2 versions of candidate payload fingerprints given n malware
samples, but the hierarchical clustering algorithm also has a quadratic complex-
ity with respect to the number of analyzing targets. Due to the overall quartic
complexity of the algorithm, directly using it to analyze large number of samples
becomes a time-consuming task. Therefore, we further develop two methods to
improve the scalability of the clustering analysis procedure, and hereafter refer
them as Opt-1, and Opt-2.
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5.1 Opt-1: Optimize Each Pairwise Computation
The first method to speed up the overall clustering process is to optimize each
pairwise computation. Broder proposed minHash [3] to quickly estimate the
Jaccard similarity of two sets without explicitly computing the intersection and
the union of two sets. By considering our bit-vector fingerprint as a set, we apply
minHash to further transform a large fingerprint into a smaller size signature, and
calculate the similarity of minHash signatures to estimate the Jaccard similarity
of the original fingerprints.
To apply minHash, we define a minHash function output of our bit-vector
fingerprint h(fp) to be the first non-zero bit index on a randomly permutated
bits order of the fingerprint. We then apply the same minHash function to two
fingerprint fpa and fpb. This will generate the same minHash value when the
first non-zero bit indexes for two fingerprints fpa and fpb are the same. Since
the probability that the firstly encountered bit is a non-zero bit for fpa and fpb
is conceptually the same as Jaccard similarity Similarity(fpa, fpb) [18], we use
such probability Pr[h(fpa) = h(fpb) to estimate the original Jaccard similarity.
The probability estimation becomes more accurate if more independent min-
Hash functions are used together. Formally, we define a minHash signature
sig(fp) to be a set of k minHash function values extracted from k round of
random permutations over the fingerprint, and represent it as follows: sig(fp) =
[h1(fp), h2(fp), ..., hk(fp)]. We denote the similarity of two minHash signatures as
the ratio of equal elements between sig(fpa) and sig(fpb).
Instead of maintaining k random permutations over the bit-vector, we follow
a common practice for using minHash technique and use k different hash func-
tions to simulate k random permutations, where each hash function maps a bit
index to a value. In order to create k hash functions, we first generate k random
numbers, then use FNV [9] hash algorithm to produce a basic hash output for
each bit index, and finally apply XOR operation between each random number
and the hash output to get the k hash outputs. For each hash function, we select
the smallest hash value (to simulate the first non-zero bit index) over all of the
bit indexes of the fingerprint as the final hash output.
Note that the FNV hash value and the k random numbers are all 32 bits
unsigned integers, and they can be used to safely simulate random permutation
over 512MB bit-vector fingerprint. In practice, the k value usually needs to be
larger than 100 to generate good enough results [18]. We set k to be 256 in our
experiments, and thus convert each bit-vector fingerprint into a 1KB minHash
signature.
In order to evaluate the potential impact of Opt-1 on accuracy, we conduct
two experiments on the smallest 50 malware families7: one experiment (Exp-1)
with no optimization, and another experiment (Exp-2) using Opt-1. We used the
clustering output from Exp-1 as a reference, and measured the precision and
recall of the clustering output from Exp-2. The precision and recall indicate how
7 We select those families since their maximum family size is under 100 and all the
experiments for those families can be finished within 1 hour.
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similar the two experiments results are, and are used to check the impact on
accuracy brought by Opt-1.
Our experiments showed that on average Exp-2 took less than 83% time to
complete compared to Exp-1 for the analyzed families, and the average preci-
sion and recall of the clustering output were 0.993 and 0.986. Opt-1 significantly
reduce the overall memory consumption with minHash signature representa-
tion and improve the pairwise computation efficiency with almost zero accuracy
penalty.
5.2 Opt-2: Employ approximate clustering
The previous optimization is still not sufficient for using the algorithm to analyze
large scale malware samples. For instance, when analyzing with 2,000 samples,
the algorithm will create 1,999,000 candidate payloads, and it results in approx-
imately 2.0 × 1012 pairwise comparison. Even 1% of the total comparison still
takes lots of computation resources. To resolve the scalability issue for a large
dataset input, we further adopt prototype-based clustering technique [16,22] to
achieve approximate clustering.
Specifically, we randomly divide the target samples into small size (e.g., 150)
groups. For each group, we apply hierarchical clustering analysis on the shared
payload within the group, and create a prototype fingerprint for each payload
cluster by applying intersection analysis (to obtain all the shared 1-bit) among
the payload fingerprints in each cluster. We then conduct hierarchical clustering
analysis on all the collected prototype fingerprints. In this way, we represent
a group of similar payload fingerprints with a single prototype fingerprint, and
the algorithm proceeds with approximate clustering analysis using the prototype
fingerprints instead of the original payload fingerprints.
We design two experiments to evaluate the impact of Opt-2 on accuracy:
one experiment (Exp-3) using Opt-1 only, and another experiment (Exp-4) using
Opt-1 and Opt-2. Due to the quartic complexity of the original algorithm, the
overall analysis (using Opt-1 only) will get dramatically slower for analyzing
larger number of malware samples. For instance, we found it takes about one
day to analyze 1000 samples and more than five days to analyze 2000 samples
for Exp-3. In order to conduct the evaluation within reasonable amount of time,
we randomly select 70% of labeled samples from the largest 4 malware families
and conduct the two experiments for each family. We used the clustering output
generated by Exp-3 as reference, and measured the precision and recall of the
clustering output generated by Exp-4 to evaluate the accuracy impact brought
by Opt-2.
Our experiments showed that on average Exp-4 can speed up more than
95% compared to Exp-3, and the average precision and recall for the analyzed
4 families were 0.955 and 0.932. This optimization makes it feasible to apply
our algorithm to analyze a bigger scale of malware families while providing a
desirable trade-off option between speed and accuracy.
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6 Experiments
In this section, we describe the data preparation procedure, and report malware
clustering results and key findings of our experiments.
6.1 Data Preparation
We obtained a large collection of potentially malicious Android apps (rang-
ing from late 2010 to early 2016) from various sources, include Google Play,
VirusShare [23] and third party security companies. In order to prepare ground-
truth family labeling for the datasets, we queried the collected apps against
VirusTotal [29] around April 2016, and used the scanning results to filter out
potentially ambiguous apps.
To assign family labels to the collected malware samples, we applied the
following steps: (1) tokenized VirusTotal scanning results and normalized the
contained keywords, and then counted the total number of occurrences of each
keyword. (2) removed all the generic keywords such as Virus, Trojan, and
Malicious. (3) detected keyword aliases by calculating the edit distances be-
tween keywords. For example, Nickyspy, Nickspy, Nicky, and Nickibot were
all consolidated into Nickispy. (4) assigned the dominant keyword as the family
label for the sample. A keyword was considered as dominant if it satisfied two
conditions: (a) the count of the keyword was larger than a predefined threshold
t (e.g., t=10), and (b) the count of the most popular keyword was at least twice
larger than the counts of any other keywords.
Table 2. Clearly Labeled Malware Families
Name Size Name Size Name Size Name Size Name Size
Dowgin 3280 Minimob 145 Erop 48 Vidro 23 Koomer 15
Fakeinst 3138 Gumen 145 Andup 48 Winge 19 Vmvol 13
Adwo 2702 Basebridge 144 Boxer 44 Penetho 19 Opfake 13
Plankton 1725 Gingermaster 122 Ksapp 39 Mobiletx 19 Uuserv 12
Wapsx 1657 Appquanta 93 Yzhc 37 Moavt 19 Svpeng 12
Mecor 1604 Geinimi 86 Mtk 35 Tekwon 18 Steek 12
Kuguo 1167 Mobidash 83 Adflex 32 Jsmshider 18 Spybubble 12
Youmi 790 Kyview 80 Fakeplayer 31 Cova 17 Nickispy 12
Droidkungfu 561 Pjapps 75 Adrd 30 Badao 17 Fakeangry 12
Mseg 245 Bankun 70 Zitmo 29 Spambot 16 Utchi 11
Boqx 214 Nandrobox 65 Viser 26 Fjcon 16 Lien 11
Airpush 183 Clicker 58 Fakedoc 26 Faketimer 16 Ramnit 9
Smskey 166 Golddream 54 Stealer 25 Bgserv 16
Kmin 158 Androrat 49 Updtkiller 24 Mmarketpay 15
Although our malware labeling process may look similar to AVclass [27], we
developed the approach independently without the knowledge of the AVclass;
and both work was finished around the same time. The unlabeled samples were
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not included in the malware dataset for clustering analysis. In summary, we
collected 19,725 labeled malware samples from 68 different families, and the
detailed breakup of the malware samples is shown in Table 2.
Besides the above labeled malware dataset, we also collected Android Genome
malware samples [34] to obtain an optimal clustering threshold, and randomly
selected a list of 10,000 benign samples from AndroZoo [1] to evaluate the ac-
curacy of the library removal procedure. In particular, we selected benign apps
that were created around the same time (before Jan 1st, 2016) as most of the
labeled malware samples, and their latest (Mar 2017) VirusTotal re-scanning
results showed no malicious labels.
6.2 Feature Collision Analysis
The accuracy of the proposed clustering system and the correctness of the re-
constructed malicious payloads relies on the assumption that unique features
will be mapped to unique bit locations within the bit-vector fingerprint. Fea-
ture collision is directly impacted by two parameters: an n-gram size, and a
bit-vector fingerprint size. To evaluate a feature collision rate, we varied the n-
gram size (2 and 4) and the bit-vector fingerprint size, and then measured how
many unique features were mapped to the same single bit position, i.e., feature
collision. Figure 5 illustrates feature collision with regard to different n-gram
sizes and fingerprint sizes.
The graph shows that feature collision occurs more frequently when the fin-
gerprint size is small. The total number of unique features depends on the n-gram
size. For the labeled malware, it was about 4.1 million for 2-gram features, and
14.4 million for 4-gram features. And for the benign dataset, it was about 15.2
million for 2-gram features, and 45.3 million for 4-gram features. According to
the pigeonhole principle, when putting N unique features into M buckets, with
N > M , at least one bucket would contain more than one unique features. This
means that we need to set the bit-vector fingerprint size larger than the to-
tal number of unique features to reduce feature collision. Therefore, we set the
default n-gram size to be 2 and default fingerprint size to be 1024KB which pro-
vides 8,388,608 unique bit positions. With the above configuration, the unique
feature per bit value was reduced to 0.49 to process the labeled malware dataset.
Notice that the complete feature space is unlimited for our system due to the
inclusion of arbitrary string values, however the true unique features contained
in a certain dataset will be limited.
6.3 Library Removal Accuracy
Besides the random feature collision discussed in the previous section, it is also
possible that feature collision may happen between the app code and the ir-
relevant versions of the library code. To evaluate the library removal accuracy,
we assumed the libraries used in benign samples were not purposefully manipu-
lated, and measured the precision (e.g., how much of the removed code is true
library code) and recall (e.g., how much of the true library code is removed) of
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library code removal results for the prepared benign samples. Particularly, we
considered the code that were defined under the official library names in the
benign samples as ground truth library code, and created the true library code
fingerprint fptrue by mapping all the features from the true library code to a
bit-vector fingerprint. After removing the library code from each app, we iden-
tified the bit positions that were presented in the original app fingerprint and
were removed subsequently; and used the identified bit positions to generate re-
moved library code fingerprint fpremoved. Using the containment ratio calculation
function as discussed in Section 3.1, library removal precision Plib is defined as
S(fptrue∧fpremoved)
S(fpremoved)
, and library removal recall Rlib is defined as
S(fptrue∧fpremoved)
S(fptrue)
, where
S(·) denotes the number of 1-bits in the bit-vector.
Figure 6 depicts the library removal precision and recall for the benign apps.
We observed that 9,215 benign apps contained at least one legitimate library,
and the median values for precision and recall were 0.94, 0.95, respectively. We
manually inspected certain corner cases with poor precision or recall. The poor
precision cases were due to incomplete true library code extraction, e.g., an older
version of Admob library contained obfuscated version of code which were not
under com.google domain, thus not counted as true library code. The poor
recall cases were due to excessive true library code inclusion, e.g., all the code
of the Androidify app was defined under com.google domain which made the
distinction of library code obscure.
6.4 Malware Clustering Results
In order to select an optimal clustering threshold for the system and assess the
performance comparing with other known Android malware clustering system,
we first applied our clustering system on the Android Genome malware dataset.
We used the classical precision and recall [2, 12, 14, 19, 22, 30] measurements to
evaluate the accuracy of clustering results. Figure 7 describes the clustering
precision and recall results with various thresholds.
The highest F-measure score was 0.82 with precision of 0.90 and recall of 0.75
when the clustering threshold was 0.85. We set the default clustering threshold
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value to be 0.85 for subsequent clustering analysis. As a reference, ClusThe-
Droid [17] achieved precision of 0.74 and recall of 0.73 while clustering 939 of
Android Genome malware samples.
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Datasets Samples Clusters Precision Recall
D1 1064 33 0.977 0.972
D2 1462 27 0.987 0.964
D3 1708 29 0.985 0.978
D4 1039 31 0.971 0.960
D5 2277 29 0.988 0.989
D6 1066 30 0.971 0.919
D7 1256 29 0.985 0.981
D8 1680 29 0.985 0.980
D9 2074 31 0.996 0.858
D10 1612 31 0.992 0.989
Fig. 8. Clustering results of different sub-
version datasets
Note that the clustering outputs produced by our system is per sub-version
instead of per family, therefore it is more challenging to properly obtain fine-
grained ground truth labels to evaluate the accuracy. In fact, this was the main
reason for a bit low recall of our system with respect to coarse-grained ground
truth labels, e.g., one Android malware family samples might contain multiple
versions of malicious payloads. While reviewing the clustering results, we noticed
that 13 families of the Genome dataset contained more than one versions of
malicious payloads. For example, Basebridge contained 7 versions of malicious
payloads with threshold of 0.85.
Therefore, we separated the labeled malware samples into sub-versions using
the clustering system, and further designed several experiments to evaluate the
clustering results with manually verified sub-version ground-truth. We manu-
ally verified the correctness of the sub-version cluster results. For the generated
sub-version clusters, we first checked if the extracted payload was the indeed
malicious. Since each version of the extracted payloads usually had similar class
names and Dalvik code sequences, the maliciousness of the extracted payload can
be spotted by checking the extracted class names (e.g., similar pseudo-random
pattern). In case the class names were not enough to determine its malicious-
ness, we then went through the reconstructed code segments and checked if
there were any suspicious activities or behaviors, such as stealthily sending out
premium SMS. After verifying the maliciousness of the extracted payload, we
then randomly selected 3 samples from each sub-version group, and checked if
the selected apps contained the same version malicious payload. Out of 19,725
malware samples that were labeled with 68 families, we obtained a total of 260
verified sub-version clusters, and each cluster corresponded to one version of the
malicious payloads.
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We considered the VirusTotal family labels together with the manually veri-
fied sub-version information as ground truth, and prepared 10 experiment datasets.
For each dataset, we randomly selected 30 sub-versions from the entire ground
truth dataset (e.g., 260 sub-versions), then mixed the selected samples together
as one input dataset. The resulting datasets had different overall sizes as each
individual sub-version had different numbers of samples. The detailed dataset
sizes and sample clustering results for the 10 datasets are presented in Figure 8.
On average, the sample clustering algorithm separated the input malware sam-
ples into 29.9 clusters, which was extremely close to the reference set (i.e., 30
sub-versions). For the 10 experiment datasets, the clustering algorithm achieved
average precision of 0.984 and average recall of 0.959, the worst precision and re-
call for clustering multiple malware families were 0.971 and 0.858, which suggests
that the clustering system generated consistent and reliable outputs.
6.5 Key Findings for Malicious Payload Analysis
In this section, we report the key findings learned from the malware sub-version
verification process.
Significant library code ratio: From the labeled malware datasets, we
found that the average library code ratio was larger than 50% for the mal-
ware samples that contained at least one legitimate library. This highlights that
existing Android malware similarity analysis work becomes ineffective without
properly handling library code.
Limited versions of malicious payloads: During our experiments, we
acquired 260 versions of malicious payloads from 68 labeled malware families
while conducting clustering of each family. Among the 68 malware families, 27
families had only one version of malicious payload, and 5 families had more than
10 different versions of malicious payloads. For example, Dowgin was the largest
malware family and had 23 versions of malicious payloads extracted.
Malicious payload under popular namespaces: We conducted man-
ual analysis on the extracted malicious payloads, and noted that 29% of An-
droid malware families injected their malicious payloads under popular names-
paces, such as com.google and com.android, or legitimate advertisement library
namespaces like com.umeng. Table 3 in Appendix includes the detailed malicious
payload findings for the identified families. Since com.google and com.android
are the main class names used by Android Open Source Project and Google
Mobile Services, such malicious payloads can easily get overlooked.
7 Limitation
Our Android malware clustering approach is based on the assumption that mal-
ware authors often reuse the same malicious payload to create new malicious
samples, and the obfuscated code sequences of malicious payload would largely
remain the same if they are generated by the same obfuscation tool. This is
consistent with our findings as listed in Section 6.5. Theoretically, advanced
Yuping Li, Jiyong Jang, Xin Hu, and Xinming Ou
obfuscation techniques (e.g., class encryption or dynamic loading) can eventu-
ally break the assumption by generating a new version of a malicious payload
for every new malware instance, or completely removing the original malicious
payload from classes.dex. The attack and defense against malware obfusca-
tion is a long-term arms race, and has already been observed in the traditional
desktop malware analysis domain. For example, as observed in desktop malware
research [15,20,24], independent systems might be desirable to specifically handle
the de-obfuscation process. We consider it as a separate pre-processing step for
malware analysis, and leave a comprehensive solution for advanced obfuscation
as an orthogonal problem. In addition, using dynamic analysis with a sandbox
can help further analyze malware. However, dynamic analysis also suffers from
its own limitations, such as sandbox evasion and code coverage.
We believe that the Android malware analysis community can benefit from
our work in several aspects. (a) It offers an alternative malicious payload ex-
traction approach in which we can extract a more complete version of malicious
payloads even if the malicious payloads are injected under popular library names
or under existing functions. (b) It provides a viable solution for conducting An-
droid malware clustering analysis by checking if malware samples contain the
same version of malicious payloads. (c) Majority of Android malware samples
are not obfuscated or obfuscated by simple obfuscation tools, even for the sam-
ples we collected recently. For example, within the extracted 260 versions of
malicious payloads, we observed 181 of them had plain code, and only 79 of
them used naming obfuscation, which was a simple basic obfuscation technique
being used in practice. (d) As long as there are shared malicious code segments
regardless of obfuscation among the samples from the same malware family,
our algorithm extracts the shared patterns and uses them for deciding malware
clustering output.
8 Related Work
8.1 Android Malware Clustering and App Similarity Analysis
Due to the challenges that are discussed in Section 1, existing Android malware
clustering approaches have not been widely adopted yet. ClusTheDroid [17] was
a system for clustering Android malware using 38 features extracted from profiles
of reconstructed dynamic behaviors. Samra [25] extracted features from Android
app manifest files, and could only cluster applications into two categories using
K-means algorithm. Without properly excluding the features or behaviors that
belong to the original benign apps or legitimate libraries, traditional clustering
approaches would not be able to produce promising results.
Similarity analysis is essential for clustering, but existing Android applica-
tion similarity analysis techniques were mainly designed to detect repackaged
apps [11, 31, 33], and such overall similarity analysis based techniques cannot
be directly applied for Android malware clustering for reasons described in Sec-
tion 1. SMART [21] proposed a semantic model for Android malware analysis,
but was mainly built for malware detection and classification. Both Juxtapp [11]
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and our system use n-gram bytecode features and feature hashing [13,14,26] as
basic building blocks. However, Juxtapp excluded library code for further anal-
ysis if the core application component does not directly invoke it, which still
couldn’t differentiate a legitimate library and a bogus library with the same le-
gitimate name. Furthermore, directly using Juxtapp to cluster Android malware
will suffer the same limitations like other traditional clustering methods as it is
based on overall similarity.
8.2 Android Malicious Payload Analysis
Malicious payload identification and extraction is essential for Android malware
analysis. Zhou and Jiang [34] manually analyzed malicious payloads of Android
malware and summarized the findings in the Android Malware Genome project.
DroidAnalytics [32] presented a multi-level signature based analytics system to
examine and associate repackaged Android malware. MassVet [5] analyzed graph
similarity at the function level and extracted the shared non-legitimate functions
as malicious payloads through commonality and differential analysis, and it ap-
plied a whitelist to exclude legitimate library code from analysis.
MassVet [5] is close to our work in that both extract malicious payloads
from Android malware. However, similar to existing Android malware analy-
sis work [4–6, 8, 10], MassVet simply used library name based whitelists to ex-
clude popular library code, which can result in the failure of malicious payload
extraction, and lead to false negatives in malware detection if malicious pay-
loads are injected under popular library namespaces. In addition, due to the
function level payload granularity of MassVet, it can not be easily designed to
achieve payload-sharing based Android malware clustering, since the same func-
tion could be shared by different malware families, and the malware samples
from the same family usually share multiple functions at the same time. Last
but not least, MassVet won’t be able to extract malicious payload injected un-
der existing functions, while the instruction level payload granularity designed
by our approach enables us to precisely identify one version of malicious payload
from each Android malware, which includes all of the malicious components even
if they are injected in existing functions or across different functions.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a practical solution to conduct Android malware clus-
tering. As an internal component, the fingerprint based library removal technique
was used to distinguish a legitimate library and a bogus library that may share
the same library name. Unlike traditional clustering techniques which exam-
ine the overall similarity, we achieved Android malware clustering by checking
whether the analyzed Android malware samples shared the same version of ma-
licious payload code. Compared with existing malicious payload extraction sys-
tem, our approach extracts malicious payloads even if they were injected under
popular library namespaces or under existing benign functions, and it provides
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a more complete picture of the whole malicious payload. Our comprehensive ex-
perimental results demonstrate that our clustering approach generates consistent
and reliable outputs with high precision and recall.
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A Detailed malicious payload mining results
Table 3. Malicious payload under popular libraries
Family Popular Class Names Used
Nickispy
com.google.android.info.SmsInfo
com.google.android.service.UploadService
Uuserv
com.uuservice.status.SysCaller.callSilentInstall
com.uuservice.status.SilenceTool.MyThread.run
Fjcon
com.android.XWLauncher.CustomShirtcutActivity
com.android.XWLauncher.InstallShortcutReceiver
Yzhc
com.android.Base.Tools.replace name
com.android.JawbreakerSuper.Deamon
Gumen
com.umeng.adutils.AdsConnect
com.umeng.adutils.SplashActivity
Basebridge
com.android.sf.dna.Collection
com.android.battery.a.pa
Spambot
com.android.providers.message.SMSObserver
com.android.providers.message.Utils.sendSms
Moavt
com.android.MJSrceen.Activity.BigImageActivity
com.android.service.MouaService.InitSms
Zitmo
com.android.security.SecurityService.onStart
com.android.smon.SecurityReceiver.sendSMS
Mseg
com.google.vending.CmdReceiver
android.ad.appoffer.Copy 2 of DownloadManager
Droidkungfu
com.google.ssearch.SearchService
com.google.update.UpdateService
Dowgin
com.android.qiushui.app.dmc
com.android.game.xiaoqiang.jokes.Data9
Fakeinst
com.googleapi.cover.Actor
com.android.shine.MainActivity.proglayss Click
Ksapp
com.google.ads.analytics.Googleplay
com.google.ads.analytics.ZipDecryptInputStream
Bankun
com.google.game.store.bean.MyConfig.getMsg
com.google.dubest.eight.isAvilible
Pjapps
com.android.MainService.SMSReceiver
com.android.main.TANCActivity
Adwo
com.android.mmreader1030
com.google.ads.AdRequest.isTestDevice
Svpeng
com.adobe.flashplayer .FV.doInBackground
com.adobe.flashplayer .FA.startService
Opfake
com.android.appupdate.UpdateService
com.android.system.SurpriseService
Badao
com.google.android.gmses.MyApp
com.android.secphone.FileUtil.clearTxt
